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Abstract 
The problem we address in this thesis is to uncover the design elements in a network 
architecture design that may open it up to denial of service (DoS) attacks and to expose the 
tradeoffs in mitigating those DoS opportunities. We take as our candidate network architecture 
design the Future Internet Architecture project MobilityFirst. MobilityFirst’s overarching goal, 
driven by increasingly available wireless communication, is the support of mobility in an 
Internet architecture. At its core, MobilityFirst separates identification from location, as distinct 
from the current Internet architecture, and postulates the existence of globally unique, flat 
identifiers. In order to support mobility in this context, it also postulates a global name 
resolution service (GNRS). In this thesis we examine three alternative designs for the GNRS and 
the opportunities they expose for DoS attacks. We consider each one in depth analytically. As 
an example, we then study one particular attack in depth and are forced to conclude that 
approaches to mitigating this attack would have significant negative impact on the support of 
mobility thus exposing the dilemma in such system design tradeoffs. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Example 
Imagine a post office that provides a service allowing you to send them a postcard saying “I’m 
staying at my friend’s house for a couple days; please send my mail there.” This allows you to 
continue receiving your mail while couch-surfing. However, this service that supports frequent 
movement requires the post office to keep track of all the places where people request that 
their mail be sent. What if someone mischievously sends many postcards falsely claiming that 
they moved, or impersonates you saying that you moved? The post office now has to sort 
through all of these post cards to determine which ones are valid, and although the postman 
could check to see if you are actually at the new location while delivering mail there, this 
verification would be very time consuming.  
1.2 Summary of the Problem 
The example1 in the prior section illustrates some of the issues that arise when a system 
attempts to support mobility occurring at a time scale comparable to information delivery.  In 
the Internet, unlike the postal system, your name and address are represented as one value, 
your Internet Protocol (IP) Address. This is referred to as conflating name and location, which 
are actually two different things. A unique identifier acts as a “name” for each device connected  
to the Internet, which doesn’t change throughout the lifetime of the device, whereas your cell 
phone’s network address can change from Verizon LTE to Wi-Fi mid download. If you switch 
networks in the current Internet, your phone changes IP addresses and cannot pick up its 
conversation with the server where it left off. If all the server knows about a device is its IP 
                                                 
1 Based on the Mobile Internet Protocol where the post office represents a home agent.   
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address, then when your phone switches networks the server has no way to know it’s talking to 
the same phone. Instead, the phone has to reestablish a connection with the server and try the 
download again.  
MobilityFirst (MF) is a design for a Future Internet Architecture to replace the Internet. It 
supports separating a name, what they call a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), from a device’s 
location, called a Network Address. Once names are separate from locations, your phone could 
switch networks but continue its conversation, or session, with the server, because your phone 
retains its GUID, say GP. The server is still sending to phone GP, and your phone can verify that it 
is GP, it just happens to be at a different location now. Although MobilityFirst creates a 
desirable behavior allowing your device to move between networks without re-starting its 
remote sessions, just like the post office, this new feature may make the system of delivering 
Internet traffic susceptible to attack in new ways. This thesis studies the new system that 
supports this feature, the Global Name Resolution System.  
1.3 Summary of Findings 
Since MobilityFirst is a mostly untested, new architecture, we aim to understand its capabilities, 
strengths and weaknesses. In this thesis we examine this architecture more deeply through the 
“lens” of denial of service opportunities that arise from its unique characteristics intended to 
support wide scale and extremely dynamic mobility. The purpose of studying mobility is to 
unearth more about the resources that are critical to node mobility, and gain insight informing 
how to design robust mobile protocols in the current Internet and systematic ways of thinking 
about mobility.   
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While many different attacks are discussed, our main finding involves a malicious server 
attacking a target server in a distributed hash table implementation of a Global Name 
Resolution Service. In this case, solutions to address the attack would involve tradeoffs that 
negatively impact the system’s ability to support rapid mobility, limiting either which GUIDs 
could register with a part of a distributed GNRS or how frequently they could change their 
name record.  
This thesis presents related work in Chapter 2 to set the background for Global Name 
Resolution System Designs, discussed in Chapter 3. This is followed by a discussion of their key 
resources and possible vulnerabilities in Chapter 4 and a demonstration of an attack in Chapter 
5. Chapter 6 discusses the effects of the underlying transport layer protocol. Chapter 7 
overviews possible future work and Chapter 8 concludes the thesis.   
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2. Background 
Using Denial of Service to study the efficacy of MobilityFirst is a part of Sollins’s work proposed 
in [1]. Other work has been done studying Denial of Service attacks in another Future Internet 
Architecture, Named Data Networking, but not in MobilityFirst. Their examination of Denial of 
Service attacks led to a better understanding of Named Data Networking architecture and 
influenced a revision of the protocol to include negative acknowledgements [2, 3, 4]. A well-
known attack in Named Data Networking is an Interest Flooding attack, where an attacker 
floods a router’s Pending Interest Table with many requests for nonexistent named content. 
Since the content did not exist, these requests would remain in a routers Pending Interest 
Table, filling it up. The negative acknowledgement implements the software design paradigm of 
“failing fast”, and informs the router that it can drop these requests because the data is not 
coming, and significantly decreases the effectiveness of the attack.  
2.1 MobilityFirst 
MobilityFirst (MF) [5] is a Future Internet Architecture proposed by Venkataramani et al. that 
assumed we could replace the Transport and Internet Layers of the Internet protocol suite. 
MobilityFirst’s primary design goals are mobility and trustworthiness.  
The main aspects of the MobilityFirst architecture are storage aware routing, the management 
plane, the compute layer, and the Global Name Service (GNS). The management plane is 
federated and provides aggregate network information used to perform accounting and 
address problems and attacks.  The GNS consists of a Name Certification Service and a name 
resolution service, often called a Global Name Resolution Service (GNRS). 
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This thesis focuses on the GNRS, which maps GUIDs to NAs. Instead of IP addresses, 
MobilityFirst has Globally Unique Identifiers (GUIDs) which are like “names”. Like other 
proposed Future Internet Architectures, MF does not conflate identity and location [5, 6]. In 
MF, GUIDs are self-certifying and represent interfaces, devices, services, content, human end-
users, and groups of GUIDs [5]. Locations are represented by Network Addresses. A Network 
Address is the identifier of a network. Unlike an IP address, it is not unique to the named entity, 
often a device, that is attached to it.  
 
Figure 1. GNRS and DNS. The GNRS provides one of the two resolution tasks that the Domain Name Service handles 
in the current Internet. The other is performed by a Name Certification Service. Recall from 2.1 that a Network 
Address is a reference to a sub-network that knows where a GUID is. NAs are used inside the Future Internet to 
forward traffic to its destination. 
MF encourages competition between Name Certification Services (NCSs), which bind “human -
readable descriptors” to GUIDs. Unlike IP addresses, GUIDs are not hierarchical. Since they are 
flat, naively, looking up the location of a GUID can take time on the order of the number of 
GUIDs. Since routing at the level of GUIDs can be so inefficient, a Global Name Resolution 
Service (GNRS) is necessary to efficiently map GUIDs to one or more Network Addresses. 
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Network Addresses can be thought of as a logical gateway that corresponds to a subnetwork, 
either an Autonomous System or Internet Service Provider, which contains GUIDs. Network 
Addresses are also self-certifying. Another key resource is the GUID and its self-certifying 
nature. The GNRS essentially resolves a GUID by providing a translation from GUID to NA. We 
are looking at the GNRS specifically because it is a key resource everything needs access to: 
“The GUID-based communication assisted by the GNS forms the ‘narrow waist’ of the MF 
architecture…” [5].  
2.2 Denial of Service Attacks 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to deny access to a service or part of a network to an 
audience. A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is a DoS attack that is distributed across 
many computers, often a recruited botnet. DoS and DDoS attacks illuminate the security and 
resiliency of proposed architectures by demonstrating how a system can cease functioning [1]. 
The challenge of trying to prevent an attack without creating an opportunity for a new one can 
be especially insightful.  
Mirkovic et al. suggest ways to group DDoS attacks: by degree of automation, source address 
validity, attack rate dynamics and persistence of agent set, possibility of characterization, 
exploited weakness, victim type, and the impact on the victim [7]. In their “Survey of Network-
Based Defense Mechanisms Countering the DoS and DDoS Problems” Peng et. al. describe four 
categories of defense against DoS: Prevention, Detection, Source Identification, and Reaction 
[8]. Prevention mainly uses filtering to limit the ability to spoof IP addresses, including 
ingress/egress filtering, Router-Based Packet Filtering which basically filters between ASs at 
border routers, and the Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE) Protocol, in which routers 
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keep a table with valid addresses for each interface. The authors ultimately claim that spoofing 
is happening less frequently in DoS attacks. The path of least resistance can be to find 
vulnerable systems on the Internet and use their IP addresses, as in a botnet. One reason that 
DDoS attacks are so hard to detect is that a “flash crowd”, legitimate traffic that can occur 
when many people suddenly look up the same thing, can appear like a DDoS attack. Denial of 
Service attacks are tricky precisely because they can look like legitimate traffic; it’s much  easier 
to have false positives than other network security attack types. One could even argue that an 
“attacker” trying to take advantage of the system still falls under legitimate use if they are 
following the system’s protocol. If not, in the worst case scenario where an attacker can 
generate false positives that affect their target, stopping what looks like attack traffic actually 
helps the attacker achieve their goal.   
Defenses for attack detection break into two main categories: DoS attack-specific, which look 
for known attacks, and anomaly-based, where a traffic is compared to a “normal profile”. The 
challenge with identifying the source of an attack is that IP routing is stateless and addresses 
are not verified before they are allowed to send traffic. One suggestion to aid in detection is 
“Probabilistic IP Traceback” where routers probabilistically append their IP address to packets 
such that the packets can be “traced back” from where they came from. Overall, Peng et. al. 
conclude that the decentralization of the Internet and lack of economic incentives to 
implement defenses, along with the current state of affairs being “good enough” are the main 
challenges that prevent the implementation of defenses. They suggest that ISPs are a good 
place to start because they are a preexisting group of routers than can work cooperatively 
without overhauling the entire Internet.   
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A significant feature of both Mirkovic’s and Peng’s papers is that they focus on types of attacks. 
In contrast, this research will focus on the kinds of resources that are attackable, in order to 
understand how those resources are utilized to support supporting rapid mobility in  
MobilityFirst.   
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3. GNRS System Designs 
The Internet was not designed for mobility, but with the development and prevalence of 
wireless technology, mobility has become commonplace. MobilityFirst was designed with the 
primary goals of mobility and trust. Mobility occurs when a single identity relocates. This 
includes, but does not always necessitate, a device physically moving. For example, a phone 
switching between WiFi and 4G LTE changes the network address of the phone. Even though 
the phone did not physically move, the route a packet takes over the network topology may 
have changed drastically, resulting in packet loss due to mobility. This mobility can occur 
rapidly, causing Future Internet Architectures to support the separation of nominal identifiers 
from location identifiers. As Vu et. al. stated in their paper on DMap, one of the proposed GNRS 
implementations: “Intuitively, it is easier to work with networking primitives based on 
identifiers when the locator changes faster than the timescales of the communication session” 
[9, p. 1]. This is true because the details of mobility and how addresses change with mobility are 
abstracted away by the GUID.  
Just like the white pages allow us to look up someone’s address given their name, the Domain 
Name Service will translate well-known names, like “google.com” into Google’s IP address for 
us. Since IP addresses represent both name and location, only one step is necessary. In 
MobilityFirst, after translating a human-readable name like “google.com” to a corresponding 
GUID, there is an extra step to find the location of that GUID. This is advantageous because it 
allows an entity to retain its globally unique identifier, but change its location. This extra step of 
resolving a GUID to its current location is accomplished by the Global Name Resolution Service. 
The first step, resolving a human-friendly name to a GUID, is performed by a Name Certification 
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Service. The details related to this resolution are outside the scope of this project because it is 
outside the core architecture of MobilityFirst.  
This thesis focuses on the second step of retrieving a Network Address for a GUID, which is 
done with a Global Name Resolution Service (GNRS). Adding this location flexibility creates new 
opportunities for attacks in the global network, as adding new features creates opportunities 
for bugs and misuse in any system. In the most basic form, there are three primary attackable 
resources in a network: bandwidth, computation, and storage. The proposed ideas have a 
tradeoff between these three resources. For example, supporting mobility without having a 
physically separate GNRS would utilize shared storage with routers inside the network to obtain 
and store up to date location information. This is the case in two GNRS designs: DMap and 
GMap. If the location information is represented in a resolution service that is invoked prior to 
the traffic being sent, then the storage, computation and bandwidth resources proposed for 
the resolution service must be analyzed to determine how they introduce vulnerabilities into 
the network.  
There are three proposed GNRS implementations, DMap, GMap and Auspice. All of them 
support the ideas of Insert and Lookup Requests. Insert Requests are messages designed to 
support the insertion of a mapping from a GUID to its Network Address(es) into the GNRS. This 
mapping, which may hold additional data, is called a name record, and the Network Address(es) 
may be called the bindings of that GUID. Additionally, the GNRSs support Lookup Requests that 
fetch the name record. The rest of this Chapter describes and compares the three 
implementations. Their DoS vulnerabilities are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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3.1 DMap 
The first proposed GNRS implementation, DMap, named after its use of Direct Mapping, is an 
in-network distributed hash table2 [9]. DMap distributes K global replicas for each GUID to NA 
mapping among participating routers. When a new device connects, its GUID is hashed into K IP 
addresses using K independent hash functions. The servers that announce these IP addresses 
store a mapping between the GUID and its location(s). The location, a Network Address, is a 
reference to the Autonomous System that contains the new device. An example with K=1 is  
shown in Figure 2.   
                                                 
2 For background information on distributed hash tables, see Chord [30].  
Figure 2. DMap Insert and Lookup. GUID GX, located at 58.0.0.1, connects to the network via the server at 45.0.0.5. 
This server hashes GX with hash function H to obtain the address of the server that will store G X’s location, in this 
case, 128.5.5.5. GX’s location can be queried from 128.5.5.5, which any server can compute by taking H(GX).  
16 
 
3.1.1 Local Replication 
In Figure 2, if a different router in AS 1 wants to route to GX, it would first have to hash GX: H(GX) 
= 128.5.5.5. Then, if naively following the DMap protocol, it would ask 128.5.5.5 where GX is 
located. This could result in an unnecessarily long lookup time, especially if AS 1 and AS 2 are 
far away or do not have a high bandwidth connection. DMap attempts to deal with this by 
including local replication. In addition to each of the K global copies of the (GX, AS 1) mapping, it 
will also use a hash function to determine a local server on which to store (GX, AS 1). When 
servers look up a GUID, they simultaneously send requests to the local server that would know 
if the GUID is in their Autonomous System and to a “global” copy, using one of the original K 
hash functions. As shown in Figure 3, the server in AS 4 also queries 198.4.4.4 to see if GX is 
located in AS 4.  
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3.1.2 Multihoming 
DMap supports multihoming, a device attached to the network with more than one connection. 
Multiple locations can be sent with an original Insert request. Alternatively, if DMap has already 
has a location for a GUID and receives another Insert message, the additional address is simply 
appended to the list of addresses for that GUID. DMap permits each GUID to be associated with 
up to 5 NAs at once, and to assign expiration times and prioritization weights to each network 
address. Since a new Insert message does not remove an old network address for a GUID, an 
Update Message is also defined for when the GUID moves from a network address to a new 
one. 
Figure 3. DMap with Local Replication. When looking up a GUID, servers use a local hash function, H LOCAL, to 
simultaneously ask a local server if GX is in the same Autonomous System as the requester. Similarly, when a GUID 
is inserted, a local hash function is used to place a DMap record in that GUID’s AS.  
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3.1.3 Edge Cases 
Like many implementations of complex protocols and systems, DMap defines and handles some 
uncommon but expected edge cases. Since they are expected to be outside the norm of 
operation, edge cases often lead to interesting attack opportunities. An edge case DMap 
considers is that of hashing GUIDs to “nonexistent” IP addresses. DMap is currently 
implemented on top of the IP layer, and relies on IPv4 [10]. DMap uses the list of BGP prefix 
announcements to know which ASs announce which subsets of the IPv4 space in the current 
version of DMap. The IP Hole Problem is the phenomenon that some IP addresses are 
unclaimed by ASs. If a GUID hashes to an unclaimed network address, it is rehashed up to M-1 
times. If, after M total hashes, a GUID still hashes to an unannounced IP address, a Deputy AS, 
an AS with the closest IP distance to the final hashed IP address, will host the GUID-NA 
mapping. Later, if an AS has new servers join and announces additional IP addresses, it is 
possible that some already hosted GUID mappings would belong on the new server.  The DMap 
architecture includes a GUID migration message so that the new announcing AS can tell the 
corresponding Deputy AS that it has now joined the network and can host the mapping, 
prompting the Deputy AS to drop that mapping.  
3.2 Auspice 
Auspice [11, 12] is another proposed global name resolution service (GNRS) that can support 
current Internet architecture and MobilityFirst Future Internet Architecture. Auspice’s records 
are more broadly defined than DMap’s GUID to NA mapping. They allow each GUID to be 
associated with a name record consisting of arbitrarily many key value pairs. This supports 
“novel network-layer functions such as simultaneous mid-connection mobility and context-
aware communication” [11, p. 7]. Auspice allows blacklists, which prohibit write access to 
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GUIDs listed, and/or whitelists, which only allow write access to GUIDs listed, for each key value 
pair in a GUID’s name record. Auspice defaults to only allowing the GUID itself to change its 
Network Address(es), but may allow a third party system to append traits, like geo-location or 
friends, to a GUID’s name record. An example Auspice name record is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Example Auspice Name Record. Name records are JSON objects. This is an example from 
edu.umass.cs.gnsclient.examples.ClientExample in [13]. 
3.2.1 Replica-Controllers 
Auspice uses a fixed number of replica-controllers for each name, which “dispatch” active 
replicas for that name. The replica-controllers collect aggregate frequency and location 
information about requests for their assigned GUID made to its active replicas, and control the 
placement of active replicas. As shown in Figure 5, active replicas actually store the GUID and its 
name record, including its network address. A client can determine replica-controllers for a 
GUID using a hash function, similar to lookups in DMap. After sending a request to a replica-
controller, the client receives a list of the current replicas for that GUID and can ask the nearest 
replica for the GUID’s name record.  
{"occupation":"rocket scientist", "ip address":"127.0.0.1", "name":"frank", 
"location":"work", "friends":["Joe","Sam","Billy"], 
"flapjack":{"sally":{"left":"eight","right":"seven"}, "sammy":["One","Ready","Frap"]}} 
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Figure 5. Auspice System Overview. “Geo-distributed name servers in Auspice. Replica-controllers (logically 
separate from active replicas) decide placement of active replicas and active replicas handle requests from end -
users. N1 is a globally popular name and is replicated globally; name N2 is popular in select regions and is 
replicated in those regions” Figure and Caption from [11, p. 5].  
Replica-controllers are contacted “infrequently” by a client or Local Name Server (1) when the 
Local Name Server (LNS) receives a request for a name it has not seen before, and (2) when the 
active replica the LNS had previously queried is no longer an active replica for a specific name. 
The assumption that this is infrequent is discussed in Chapter 4.  
3.2.2 Demand Aware Placement 
Auspice places replicas with the key, value pairs considering both recent demand and update 
frequency. To keep the “demand aware” placement recent, the placement of replicas is 
evaluated and adjusted after a pre-determined time period called an epoch. At the beginning of 
each epoch, Auspice tunes the number and location of active replicas for each GUID using 
Equation 1. The system considers the update and lookup rate for that GUID, the geo-distribution 
of requests for that GUID, and the overall load on the system (across all GUIDs).  
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number of replicas for GUID 𝐺𝑋 = 𝑀 +  𝛽 (
𝐺𝑋  𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝐺𝑋  𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
) 
where 𝛽 satisfies 𝜇𝐶 = ∑ 𝑀(𝑖 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) + (𝛽 + 1)(𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑢𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
𝑖 ∈ GUIDs
 
Equation 1. Demand-Aware Replica Placement. C is the total capacity of all servers running Auspice. μ is a 
parameter less than one representing the target utilization.  M is a fault tolerance parameter indicating the 
minimum number of replicas for a GUID. This equation is a reformatted version of Equation 1 in [11, 12]. 
3.2.3 Paxos 
Auspice allows a GUID to recursively map to a list of other GUIDs, so that an application can 
send to multiple GUIDs in a category the same way it would send to a single GUID. An often-
used geocasting example is sending a message to all taxis in New York City. In order to have the 
same behavior no matter which replica a message is sent to, GUID lists must be synchronized. 
In order to keep these operations consistent across the distributed system, Auspice uses Paxos. 
There are two Paxos instances for each GUID, one for the Replica-controllers and one for the 
Active Replicas. Total write ordering is guaranteed across updates for active replicas. Stoppable 
Paxos is used so that when the active replicas are updated, at most once each epoch the Paxos 
instances can be paused until the switch has been made.  The authors of Auspice have designed 
and implemented their own version of Paxos for Auspice, which they call GigaPaxos [14].  
3.3 GMap 
GMap is an updated version of DMap that also considers geographic location when distributing 
the GUID-NA pairs [15]. GNRS Servers are also represented by GUIDs, which are called Server 
Identifiers (SIDs). GMap distributes K replicas for each GUID to NA mapping among global 
replicas, regional replicas and local replicas. Regional replicas are in the same country as the 
GUID’s NA and local replicas are in the same city or metropolitan area as the GUID’s NA.  
Assuming the geolocation of the NA and the replicas are known, there is no extra information 
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that must be stored in order to place the GUID-NA mappings at replicas. However, it is unclear 
what GMap does when a GUID is multi-homed.  GMap’s authors argue that updating per GUID 
as in Auspice leads to scalability problems.  
GMap does not have the same extensibility design goals as Auspice, but does mention that 
“Application-specific policies on the GUID-to-NA mapping are supported by extensible fields of 
key, value pairs” [15, p. 6]. Unlike Auspice, GMap delegates the computationally expensive task 
of searching for GUIDs by attributes to the Name Certification Service, although recursively 
defined groups of GUIDs are still handled by the GNRS. By leaving the computational demands 
in the GNRS, an attacker wishing to flood the network with nonsense packets still has a 
multiplicative attack opportunity. The attacker can send a request to a GUID that recursively 
resolves to many GUIDs and have GMap send its packet to each of them.   
In Auspice, a server needs to ask a replica-controller which replica is responsible for any given 
GUID. In GMap, instead of needing to ask a central resource, each server can compute the SID 
responsible for a specific GUID. The basic idea is similar to DMap, though the function used to 
determine the server differs. The authoritative SID for a GUID is defined to be the SID that, 
when XORed with the GUID, yields the smallest value.  
3.3.1 Asking the Geographically Closest Server 
It makes sense to ask a nearby server where a GUID is, if any nearby servers know. Since there 
is no way to know a priori whether GUID X is in the current region – we are looking up its 
location after all – the requesting server assumes it is and asks a server that would be X’s local 
replica. Computing which server to request the mapping for a GUID becomes complicated when 
trying to leverage geographic location. When a router receives a lookup request for X with GUID 
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GX, it first checks its cache for GX. On a cache miss, the router will compute all of the replicas for 
GX, assuming that X is in the same local area as itself. If X is not in the same local area as the 
router, then the router will not receive a response from any of the K3 servers in its city whose 
SIDs XORed with GX have the lowest values. The server will then send requests to the K2 servers 
in its region whose SIDs XORed with GX have the lowest values, which will only respond if X is in 
the same region as the requesting server. Finally, if X is not in the same region as the requesting 
server, the server will ask the global replica(s) for X, which are not constrained by any 
geographic boundary and have the lowest value when XORed with GX. This situation is 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. GMap Lookup Requests. Router Y looks up the NA of GUID GX. It first contacts two servers that do not 
have any information for GUID GX, since it incorrectly assumes X is in the same city, then region, as Y.  
Since the global replica(s) are not dependent on X’s actual location, the computed global replica 
will always be the actual global replica for GX, and can be considered an “authoritative” server 
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for GX. When X moves enough to change its region, the K1 authoritative server(s) will still be the 
nearest XOR to GX, and will just have to be updated, but the K3 local and K2 regional servers will 
need to discard X’s information and the new local and regional replicas will have to be 
determined and updated. If global, regional, and local replicas are distributed equally,two-
thirds of the servers change when X changes regions. Whenever X moves, the cached copies of 
GX-NAX become stale.  
3.3.2 GMap Uses Caching to Compensate for Popular GUIDs 
In GMap, caching is used to spread out the workload associated with looking up “hotspot 
GUIDs” [15] by keeping additional copies of popular GUID’s name records in routers’ caches 
along the paths request responses traverse. The contents of a GMap cache entry are shown in 
Figure 7. 
GUID  NA  
Remaining TTL  
Pt Go-through probability for time period t  
Ut Number of NA updates during t 
Ht Number of hits for GUID during t 
Ct Perceived update counter Ct = Ut / Ht 
Ct-1 Perceived update counter for last time period 
Figure 7. GMap Cache Entry 
𝑃𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑡 + (𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡−1), constrained to [0, 1] 
Equation 2. GMap Cache Go-through probability. The go-through probability dictates the frequency with which a 
cache hit is allowed to “go-through” to the next hop. Allowing some traffic through passively updates the cache 
entry, keeping it current. 
The caching in a GMap server takes into account the local demand for each GUID in the server’s 
cache. It does not collect aggregate information and statistics about every GUID, and since hits 
and updates are only recorded and used locally, geographic information is not stored.  A server 
25 
 
is storing a limited amount of load information for each GUID: keeping two counters, Ut and Ht, 
and two static values, Pt and Ct-1.  
3.4 Summary 
Separate from a Name Certification Service, the main task of a GNRS is to retrieve Network 
Addresses (NAs) associated with globally unique identifiers (GUIDs).  
The proposed Global Name Resolution Services make tradeoffs. DMap is the simplest and most 
straightforward. In DMap and GMap, there are a fixed number of replicas for each GUID, 
regardless if it someone’s personal device or a server with much more traffic. GMap uses 
demand-aware caching to increase the number of copies of mappings for popular “hotspot” 
GUIDs without keeping global geo-specific statistics on each GUID.  
Since Auspice allows recursive GUIDs, it uses a version of Paxos to guarantee consistency. It is 
unclear how GMap keeps a consistent view of recursively defined GUIDs. DMap makes a best-
effort attempt to return the correct list of network addresses for a GUID and does not concern 
itself with consistency. If a network address does not actually have the desired GUID, the client 
can request the mapping again. In the current implementation, a random server containing the 
desired mapping is queried; with more than two replicas, it is likely that a different server will 
be queried if the mapping is requested again.  
There are some cases where it makes sense for a multi-homed device to have the priorities 
associated with its NAs differ based on the location of the mapping. For example, consider a 
device multi-homed on the MIT network and a Comcast network. This device may want to be 
reached by other computers on the MIT network through its MIT network address, and by its 
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Comcast network address by devices external to MIT. The GNRS could support this by allowing 
any GNRS servers serving the MIT network to denote a higher priority for the MIT network 
address, and all other GNRS servers expressing a higher priority for the Comcast address. 
Similar examples arise for devices connected to a military and non-military network or company 
internal and an external network. Additionally, this type of behavior is useful for load balancing. 
For example, in the current Internet, routing policies and priorities differing among different 
parts of the network is currently supported in the BIND implementation of DNS Internet 
protocols [16].  
None of the GNRS designs currently support this, though some are more adaptable to do so 
than others. Although Auspice may be best set up to accurately predict which network address 
may be the most efficient in each location because of its vast collection of statistics, it forces 
consistency and guarantees that the name record obtained from different active replicas is the 
same, preventing customization of name records on different active replicas. DMap allows the 
GUID to set the priorities for different network addresses in the insert message, which is 
forwarded to the rest of the K servers, so the name records should be identical, but it is not 
guaranteed. Since DMap already uses a separate hash function for storing the GUID’s record 
locally within its AS, it would be feasible to have that record be distinct from the K other copies. 
GMap is perhaps in the best position to customize name records based on their location, since 
it already runs different hash functions for each locality (local, regional and global).  
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 Auspice GMap DMap 
Location 
relative to 
network 
Overlaid on top of network In-network In-network 
Algorithm 
Type 
Replicated State Machine Distributed Hash Table Distributed Hash Table 
Record 
Content 
GUID to arbitrarily many key 
value pairs 
GUID to NA(s); GUIDs 
may be recursively 
defined 
GUID to up to 5 NAs, 
each with an  
expiration time and 
prioritization weight  
Replica 
Placement 
Geo-located based on 
requests 
Geo-located based on 
GUID’s physical location 
Not Geo-located. One 
Replica in the GUID’s 
AS 
Number of 
Replicas 
Adjusts # of replicas for each 
GUID based on recent 
demand and update 
frequency 
Fixed # of replicas for 
each GUID (each GUID 
has K replicas) 
Fixed # of replicas for 
each GUID (each GUID 
has K+1 replicas) 
Caching 
No caching, tries to achieve 
load balancing by adjusting 
number of replicas 
Caches GUIDNetwork 
Address Mappings to 
increase availability of 
mappings for “hotspot 
GUIDs” 
Future work 
Table 1. Comparison Table of Auspice, GMap and DMap. 
We summarize this chapter’s contents in Table 1. Having established some of the key 
components and differences in each of the Global Name Resolution System designs, it is 
necessary to consider the key resources involved in each GNRS and each of their vulnerabilities.   
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4. Key Resources and Possible Vulnerabilities 
This chapter identifies key resources in each of the GNRS system designs and forms a 
preliminary analysis from reading the DMap publication [9], Auspice and GMap technical 
reports [12, 15], and discussing the GNRSs’ design.  We first describe how an attacker can use a 
Rainbow Table to target specific routers in the system, and review a key insight gained by 
examining a Rainbow Table generated for DMap. We follow this with a discussion of three basic 
approaches an attacker can take to disrupt service in a GNRS system: volume based attacks, 
attacks that corrupt data, and attacks that involve a malicious Autonomous System. Through all 
of these approaches, we consider how they affect the key resources in a distributed network 
system: computation power, bandwidth and storage. 
4.1 Targeting with a Rainbow Table 
An attacker’s ability to target a specific server can affect all of that server’s basic resources: its 
network bandwidth, its computation power and its storage. In order to assign GUID mappings 
to servers, DMap and GMap use a well-known hash function that, given a GUID, outputs a 
network address to store the mapping on.  The hash function being static and well known gives 
an attacker an advantage when targeting GNRS servers, because the attacker can invert the 
hash function using a Rainbow Table3. Such a table can be created by mapping all GUIDs to the 
servers their mapping is stored on and keeping a chart of which GUIDs are stored on which 
servers.  
Then, an attacker can reverse the hash function, that is, look up which GUIDs will be on a 
specific server, instead of which server hosts a GUID. Once they have a list of GUIDs that are on 
                                                 
3 Rainbow Tables are commonly used to invert cryptographic hash functions, see [32].  
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a server they want to attack, they can send messages to all of these GUIDs flooding their target 
server with traffic. Initially, if messages are sent fast enough, this is an attack on the bandwidth 
to the targeted router, and if requests do get through, the computation power of the router 
may be strained. Either way, this attack should deny the resolution for most, if not all, GUIDs on 
the router. If attack messages are sent slowly so that they are successfully inserted, an attacker 
could attempt to send incorrect data, corrupting the storage of the target server.  
Auspice mitigates a similar type of attack by using epochs and necessitating system 
involvement that could easily include gatekeeping. In Auspice, a host (or a server on its behalf) 
has to ask replica-controllers where a GUID-NA mapping is for new GUIDs. This makes filtering 
possible at the server and replica-controller levels; they could notice if a specific host is asking 
for the active replicas for an unusual number of GUIDs. With both rate-limiting/filtering and a 
shuffle every epoch, Auspice makes building up an accurate Rainbow Table for which active 
replicas store which GUIDs rather challenging. In section 4.2, an attacker will use a Rainbow 
Table to determine desired GUID(s) that should be stored on a certain server (or nowhere at 
all).  
4.1.1 System Insight from a Generated Rainbow Table 
One can also gain insight as to how a system functions by examining a Rainbow Table. 
Generating a Rainbow Table demonstrated that DMap does not always map to K distinct 
Autonomous Systems. In an experiment, we ran an instance of DMap modified to generate a  
Rainbow Table.  We set K equal to three and equally distributed the IPv4 address space among 
128 ASs, simulating each AS announcing 33,554,432 addresses. Since DMap runs K independent 
hash functions, it should determine K distinct ASs to hold mappings for each GUID.  This DMap 
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instance mapped 10,000 sequential GUIDs, 224 of which mapped to less than three ASs, about 
two percent. This means that DMap does not check for unique ASs when determining the 
mapping, allowing one of the K mapping placements to collapse into another. This decreases 
the system’s resilience to failure.  In another experiment, with the same parameters for 
autonomous system prefixes and K, a Rainbow Table was generated for 1000 random GUIDs, 29 
of which mapped to only two ASs. Each AS has a limited number of gateway routers through 
which all external traffic must flow. For popular GUIDs, the K-1 ASs that do have a mapping 
must handle all traffic looking for the specific GUID-NA mapping.   
There are a couple different ways to handle this idiosyncrasy. First, there could be a designated 
“backup” hash function that is run in this situation. Instead, this could be addressed by treating 
the duplicate Autonomous System as an “IP hole” and following the existing IP hole protocol. 
Finally, one could simply increase K such that it is irrelevant if a GUID’s mapping is only stored 
on K-1 servers. GMap reduces the likelihood of such AS collisions in yet another way. GMap 
explicitly ensures that at least three (one global, one local and one regional) replicas are on 
different servers. The only possible server-collisions are among the replicas at each geographic 
level.   
4.2 Volume Based Attacks 
In this section, we review attacks based on high traffic volume that flood the servers of a GNRS 
with requests or other traffic. We consider flooding attacks in Auspice, GMap, and then DMap, 
pointing out different strategies an attacker would use in each system. The key resources in 
Auspice are the active replicas and the replica-controllers. They need to store a lot of 
information and be available for clients to look up the location of GUIDs. Although active 
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replicas are intended to handle frequent and voluminous requests, directing a similar request 
load to replica-controllers is not expected in the system design: “In practice, we expect replica-
controllers to be contacted infrequently as the set of active replicas can be cached and reused”  
[11, p. 6]. The Auspice design assumes limited contact with replica-controllers, but does not 
enforce limited contact. If an entire botnet was directed to request new names at the same 
time it could most likely overwhelm the replica-controllers managing those names, making 
replica-controllers vulnerable to such volume-based attacks.  
Similarly, an entire botnet simultaneously moving (or claiming to move) from one set of 
Network Addresses to another can overload the active replicas, stressing their computation al 
capabilities. Whenever a GUID moves from one Network Address to a Network Address 
(attached to another Autonomous System), its name record must be updated to reflect the 
change. Since the active replicas have a Paxos instance for each GUID, the update will be 
coordinated and slower than if each active replica was performing it individually. A malicious 
Local Name Server could take advantage of having a list of all active replicas for a GUID and 
forge or replay different update messages to each of the GUID’s active rep licas, forcing them to 
resolve closely timed but conflicting updates.  
As with Auspice, GMap is also vulnerable to a lookup flooding attack. The way GMap looks up 
GUIDs makes its processing power particularly vulnerable to a lookup flooding attack. When a 
local GNRS-enabled router receives a lookup request, it checks its cache for that GUID.  For 
each cache miss, the local router must then compute all replicas for the requested GUID.  An 
attacker can require a local GNRS router to do a lot of wasteful computation if they send many 
lookup requests for far away, unpopular GUIDs at once. Using unpopular GUIDs is important so 
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that they are not in the local server’s cache. Using GUIDs known to be far away is what makes 
the server perform wasteful computations. What makes GMap particularly vulnerable to this 
kind of attack is its assumption that a majority of requests for any given GUID come from 
devices geographically co-located with that GUID4. When the GUID being looked up is not 
located near the GMap server handling the query, the server handling the query must compute 
three different sets of hashes for the GUID. It runs local, regional, and global hash functions on 
the GUID, querying servers in each category in turn, as was discussed in Chapter 3 and 
demonstrated in Figure 6. Consider an attacker with access to device Y who wants to attack Y’s 
local GNRS router, RY. The attacker requests resolution of GUIDs he knows to be located far 
away from Y (or nowhere at all), requiring RY to send three times as much traffic as the attacker 
(local, regional, then global), negatively impacting its available bandwidth for legitimate 
requests. This attack could also affect RY’s storage, since it must maintain state for the servers it 
is waiting on.  
Despite this vulnerability, there are two mitigating factors that work in GMap’s favor against 
this attack. First, the attacker must use a botnet if he desires to attack a target not in his 
geographic region. Secondly, this attack only targets a single router, which is arguably not a 
core part of GMap. Routers fail all of the time, and traffic gets redirected to other routers. 
While this attack could be very successful on a specific router, it will only deny service when 
other routers are not available.  
                                                 
4 GMap is evaluated for three query localities [15]: 
“strong query locality”: 60% of GUIDs are local, 20% are regional and 20% are global 
“medium query locality”: 20% of GUIDs are local, 60% are regional and 20% are global 
“low query locality”: 20% of GUIDs are local, 20% are regional and 60% are global 
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DMap is open to a similar attack on its computation power in which an attacker requests GUIDs 
that hash to an IP hole.  The server trying to resolve the lookup has to rehash the GUID multiple 
times, per the IP hole procedure, whenever a request for them comes in. After each hash, the 
server must consult its routing table in order to ensure that the GUID cannot be stored at an 
Autonomous System serving the address corresponding to the hash. Since the IP hole protocol 
is not implemented in the current version of the DMap code, a similar but less sophisticated 
DMap attack is demonstrated and discussed in Chapter 5.  
4.3 Corrupting Data 
Instead of sending a large quantity of data to parts of the GNRS system, an attacker could focus 
on sending – or making the servers interpret – false or misleading data.  We examine this 
problem in both Auspice and GMap. 
4.3.1 Corrupting Data in Auspice 
Data corruption often provides a subtle approach to executing denial of service attacks. The 
majority of this section is dedicated to a consideration of different ways to interfere with 
Auspice’s demand aware placement through corruption of data. We also discuss how 
MobilityFirst’s GUIDs certify themselves, and discuss attacks based on how Auspice updates its 
data and the seemingly limitless amount of data Auspice offers to store.   
Tricking the geo-distribution is an attack that causes more bandwidth to be used per request, 
increasing latency and response times. As was discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, Auspice’s demand 
aware placement considers both the location and volume of requests for a GUID’s name record 
and the frequency of updates to a GUID’s name record when determining where to place active 
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replicas. An attacker can attempt to interfere with the statistics kept on one or both of these 
metrics.  
One approach to creating this interference is to bias the replica-controllers’ demand estimate, 
making them estimate more demand for a name or subset of names in a region far away from 
where peak legitimate demand is, in order to worsen or deny service to the legitimate demand. 
This could be accomplished by employing a botnet in a region geographically distant from 
legitimate peak demand to send many requests for the target name or names to change the 
geo-distribution of demand for those names. This will cause the replica-controllers to place a 
portion of active replicas for target names that should be near legitimate demand near the 
botnet instead. Auspice does limit the efficacy of this attack by updating active replicas each 
epoch, but a motivated attacker can persist in sending the botnet’s requests.  
Another way to exploit the distribution, which takes the update rate into account when 
determining the number of active replicas, is to update a name very frequently such that the 
replica-controllers limit the number of active replicas according to the Demand-Aware Replica 
Placement equation discussed in Section 3.2.2. This assumes that an attacker can spoof the 
target GUID, which is supposed to be self-certifying. The feasibility of self-certifying GUIDs is 
questionable. The authentication procedure as suggested by MobilityFirst [5] is shown in Figure 
8. With this authentication scheme, if GUID Y’s private key is every exposed, the device that 
used GUID Y as its identifier would need to obtain a new GUID. A separate issue from Y’s private 
key becoming compromised is the size of the nonce, n. A GUID should be authenticated 
whenever it starts a new session or connection, and if n is reused, the values of K+ and K-(n) 
could just be replayed.  One solution would be to first encrypt n so that devices listening on the 
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network cannot tell if n is being reused. Establishing a symmetric key between X and Y to 
encrypt n would incur further overhead. It is possible that initiating the authentication scheme 
becomes a way to attack devices or Network Addresses (which are also self-certifying GUIDs). 
 
Figure 8. Self-certifying GUID. GUID Y has a private key K-, public key K+, such that a well-known one-way hash 
function, when applied to the public key, is equal to the value of GUID Y.  
If self-certifying GUIDs are not resistant to impersonation, DMap is susceptible to a similar 
attack where inserts are created or modified in flight to have very small timeout values, which 
are sent by the inserter.  
A different way to corrupt data in Auspice is to take advantage of the Auspice system enforcing 
total write ordering for updating GUIDs (especially lists). An attack of this type requires a more 
detailed analysis of the custom version of Paxos used in Auspice, Gigapaxos, for any additional 
attack surface it brings to the system design.  
Finally, in Auspice, an attacker could just try to fill up the database with arbitrary (key, value) 
pairs that serve no purpose other than to occupy disk space.  Auspice’s “super columns”, 
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mentioned in [12]’s Section 3.2.5, are multi-purpose, customizable and extensively infinite, with 
no described or suggested limitations other than an access control list.  
Vu et. al. address similar concerns in DMap by defining name records as simple GUID-NA 
mappings and claiming that each GUID can only be associated (multi-homed) with up to 5 NAs 
[9], but this is not currently enforced in the implementation available at [10].  
4.3.2 Corrupting Data in GMap 
Another means of attacking a GNRS’s storage resources is possible in GMap. An attacker can try 
to limit the availability of GMap’s cached “hotspot GUIDs”. This is similar to interfering with 
Auspice’s demand aware placement – both attacks involve misrepresenting legitimate use of 
the GNRS in order to direct GNRS resources away from where they would be most useful. This 
is a tradeoff with tailoring a system to treat GUIDs according to how frequently they are used. 
Filling up the cache with nonsense and preventing the cache from caching legitimate hotspot 
GUIDs is especially easy since the cache replacement scheme is Least Recently Used (LRU) and 
not Least Frequently Used (LFU).  Caches have limited storage space, and a LRU cache will make 
space for new entries by discarding the entry that was requested longest ago. A LFU cache 
keeps track of how often cache entries are requested and makes space by discarding entries 
that are requested infrequently. GMap’s goal in caching is specifically to make hotspot GUIDs, 
defined as GUIDs that are most frequently requested, available. When using a LRU cache, it is 
easy for an attacker to make the cache discard these popular GUIDs by rapidly looking up 
different unpopular GUIDs. The attacker can run a loop over a number of GUIDs approximately 
equal to the size of the cache and keep requesting them. The attacker only needs to look up 
each GUID once (albeit recently) for it to take precedence over a more frequently looked up 
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GUID.  If the cache were Least Frequently Used, an attacker would have to request the same 
GUID repeatedly until its request rate surpasses the least frequently requested GUID in the 
cache before having an effect.  This attack targets system storage. However, since the caching is 
intended to decrease bandwidth usage, with a successful attack of this nature, one would 
expect bandwidth usage to increase.  
Instead of making servers store irrelevant, unpopular GUID records, an attacker could forge an 
acknowledgement with an incorrect NA for a target popular GUID. This attack is also a blow to 
storage and bandwidth. It doesn’t overflow the storage, but causes the system to store corrupt 
data. Since the client does not receive a NA that actually has the GUID, the client will likely 
submit the request again, using more bandwidth. 
DMap does not have caching implemented currently and leaves it as future work. If its caching 
is similar to its successor, GMap, it will be vulnerable to similar attacks. DMap does not verify 
that GUIDs sending insert requests are actually located where they claim to be. If DMap 
authenticates GUIDs, as reviewed in 4.3.1, then each GUID could only poison its own name 
record. The consequences of verifying a GUID’s presence at its Network Address(es) is discussed 
in Chapter 6, and other attacks against DMap system storage are discussed in the next section.  
4.3 Malicious Autonomous System 
The previous sections of this chapter have focused on what an attacker can do with a botnet or 
other limited resources. We now consider the ramifications of an attacker controlling an entire 
Autonomous system, or at least an Autonomous System’s Border Gateway Router. Attacks in 
this section initially target storage within a malicious or other Autonomous System, and, when 
successful, affect the bandwidth usage on links to the other copies of name replicas.  
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A malicious Autonomous System (AS) that announces and is therefore assigned a specific range 
of the name space, can simply not cooperate by storing DMap mappings of GUIDs to NAs.  This 
would require an attacker to control a significant portion of the name space in order to receive 
a significant portion of the mappings. One way around that would be to create a malicious AS 
that claims to host the addresses in the IP hole and becomes black hole for GUIDs that hash to 
the IP hole(s). When successful, this causes the other servers hosting mappings for affected 
GUIDs to experience more requests.  
A malicious AS could also forge GUID migration messages to ASs holding legitimate mappings 
telling them that they are Deputy ASs and to drop their mapping, disrupting the storage of 
name records. If the attacking AS manages to force all K replicas of the mapping to drop, the 
GUID will be unresolvable, completely denying service. If only some of the replicas are dropped, 
the servers hosting the other replicas may experience congestion. In order for legitimate 
migration messages to work when the Deputy AS is actually a deputy, upon receipt of a 
migration message, the Deputy AS would have to either automatically drop the mapping, or 
check if it is rightful owner of the mapping before dropping it. This computation-intensive 
checking could be mitigated by including a Boolean value with the mappings on each server, 
indicating whether the server is acting as a deputy for that record. Keeping an additional 
true/false value would require minimal additional storage, but would allow the computation to 
only be performed once, when a GUID is inserted.   
Auspice limits the impact of a rogue AS or group of servers by using replica-controllers for 
oversight and breaking up time into epochs. If a group of servers just refused to resolve GUIDs 
to NAs, the replica-controllers could remove active replicas placed there. A malicious server 
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could try to report false statistics and claim that a lot of requests for a specific GUID came to it 
and were resolved quickly.   
4.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we began by discussing an important tool in a distributed system attacker’s 
toolkit, the Rainbow Table. We followed by considering three basic approaches an attacker 
could use to deny service to all or part of a Global Name Resolution Service: sending large 
amounts of data, sending corrupting data, and taking over a system resource.  Unsurprisingly, 
significant attack opportunities arise where the systems address edge cases. These include the 
IP hole problem in DMap, the consistency guarantee provided by Auspice provided by Paxos, 
and GMap’s unique consideration of locality-based inquiries. We provide a quick overview of 
the keep points in this chapter in the following table. 
Basic 
Resource 
Targeted 
Auspice GMap DMap 
Computation 
Large-Scale 
Simultaneous Mobility 
overloads Active 
Replicas, which use 
Paxos 
Large-Scale 
Simultaneous 
Mobility – have to 
remove mapping 
from old local and 
regional servers and 
add to new local and 
regional servers 
Large-Scale 
Simultaneous 
Mobility would 
cause inconsistent 
mappings for same 
GUIDs  
Large-Scale Name 
Lookup overloads 
Replica-controllers 
Individual routers 
hash GUIDs to know 
which replicas to ask 
Individual routers 
hash GUIDs to know 
which replicas to ask 
 Send Insert Requests (with many, many entries) for “fake” GUIDs 
Bandwidth 
Interfere with Demand 
Estimate 
Request far-away 
GUIDs to waste 
local/regional 
requests 
 
Interfere with Update 
Frequency Estimate 
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More central control, 
easier to filter. Attacker 
alone can’t determine 
which GUIDs are where 
Flood all GUIDs on a specific router using 
Rainbow Table 
Is this worse than just asking that router for 
GUIDs it doesn’t actually have?  
Storage 
Paxos/Total Write 
ordering: effect on active 
replicas and replica-
controllers 
  
 Cache Overflow  
 Forge ACK with 
incorrect NA for 
target GUID 
(possibly different 
than impersonating 
GUID depending on 
structure of ACKs) 
 
Impersonate GUID, store wrong NA 
Insert GUID multihomed at 1000 addresses 
Table 2. Summary comparison of possible vulnerabilities affecting key resources.  Italics symbolize a design choice 
that is not tied to a significant vulnerability.  
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5. DMap Server Attack 
In this chapter, we look at the Internet equivalent of someone dumping a truckload of fake 
“change of address” forms at your local post office right before you submitted your change of 
address postcard. This type of attack is present in today’s Internet and often referred to as a 
DNS flooding attack.  The possibility and effectiveness of a GNRS flooding denial of service 
attack on DMap was demonstrated in a testbed. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, DMap is a direct 
mapping implementation of a GNRS that uses K well known, independent hash functions to 
determine where a name record is stored for each GUID. A volume based attack was conducted 
where a target DMap server’s socket buffer gets filled with requests from an attacker, so that 
legitimate client requests take longer or are just dropped. A Network Address, the endpoint of 
my experiment, maps to our concept of an AS, so I am not concerned with intra-AS topology. 
Malicious behavior representing attacks was added. Our analysis, as presents in Section 5.4, 
leads us to conclude that approaches to mitigating this sort of flooding DoS attack will, in turn 
have a negative impact on supporting mobility, a central objective of the MobilityFirst project.  
This is an example of the tradeoff design challenges exposed through DoS opportunity analysis.  
5.1 Recursive Inserts and Updates 
As shown in Figure 9, Insert messages coming from end-users running the client version of 
DMap protocol set a recursive option to True so that the Insert is replicated K times. Then, the 
local DMap server runs the K hash functions, stores the GUID’s network address if necessary 
(because it is one of the K servers, for local replication or due to caching), and then forwards a 
non-recursive version of the request to the remaining servers determined by the hash 
functions. After sending the remote requests to other servers, the original server, 45.0.0.5 in 
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the figure, keeps information on GX’s entries in an “awaiting responses” map. Note that the 
other servers (128.5.5.5 and 192.5.6.7) do not forward the request to each other, since they 
have a non-recursive version. After 128.5.5.5 and 192.5.6.7 run the hash functions and insert 
GX’s network address in their storage, they send Insert Response messages back to 45.0.0.5, 
which, in turn, sends a message back to GX that its insert was successful.  
 
Figure 9. DMap Normal Operation with K=2. Setting K=2 means that GX’s network address is stored on servers 
corresponding to two independent hash functions. So that the first DMap server knows it must pass the In sert 
request along to other DMap servers, the request is marked as “recursive” by GX, the device sending its Insert 
message to 45.0.0.5. Server 45.0.0.5 runs both hash functions, removes the recursive option from the Insert 
message and forwards it to the servers corresponding to the hashes of GX.    
5.2 Attack Setup  
Before setting up the attack, we had to determine an appropriate environment in which to run 
the experiment, obtain the DMap source code, and set up DMap servers, including a modified 
43 
 
attack server. The modified attack server, along with the configuration files to run the 
experiments, are available in [17]. 
5.2.1 ORBIT Testbed 
We chose the Open-Access Research Testbed (ORBIT), which was designed for Next-Generation 
Wireless Networks and runs on the Internet [18], as our experimental environment. Since it 
uses the same links that support the Internet, link behavior is realistic but not customizable. 
Simulations were used to evaluate Auspice, DMap, and GMap, but each simulation focused on 
different parts of the architecture that the system designers wanted to evaluate, leaving the 
simulations incomplete in different ways. Since we wanted to compare the GNRSs, running 
them all in the same testbed was a planned control in the experiment. ORBIT uses the ORBIT 
Management Framework [19] to execute experiments. Outages on the main grid led us to run 
the experiment on a more reliable ORBIT testbed, but its much smaller scale limited what we 
could do.  In the experimental setup, most ORBIT nodes act as an abstraction for an 
Autonomous System. We are not concerned with intra-AS traffic because it is independent of 
the GNRS. Once traffic gets to an AS, the AS can route it to the specific device in whichever way 
it sees fit. DMap is implemented in ORBIT, but not fully. Their solution for the IP hole problem 
mentioned in section II.B of [9] is not implemented in the DMap code obtained from [10], so 
the AS mapping used in the experiment covers all IPv4 addresses.  Additionally, updates are not 
included in the client, and the migration messages are not included in this version of DMap, so 
we focused our experiments on inserts and updates.  
5.2.2 DMap Server Modification 
First, let us consider the feasibility of an attacker successfully changing DMap server source 
code. DMap servers are co-located with Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) servers. Since the 
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DMap “hashing, rehashing and prefix matching processes are done locally by the border 
gateway” [9, p. 4], the DMap servers are not logically separate from BGP servers. Therefore, a 
reasonable assumption is that the DMap servers would have similar security to BGP servers. 
Since BGP is still functionally insecure [20], it would be feasible for an attacker to modify code 
on a DMap server, especially since they can use any server as the attacking server. The server 
code on the attack server in the experiment was changed to generate Insert requests, which 
usually come from a device running the DMap client. These requests were spawned according 
to a variable attack frequency. Unlike the client, the attack server did not waste its memory 
keeping state on these attack Insert messages.  Unlike a behaving GNRS Server, the attacking 
server did not remove the “recursive” setting from these generated requests. Finally, instead of  
hashing the GUID in these generated requests to determine which servers the request would be 
sent to, the list of all DMap servers was used.  
This modified server still processed external requests normally in order to not raise suspicion.  
Recall from Chapter 4.1 that the K hash functions are well known so that any DMap server that 
receives a Lookup request can determine which server(s) to ask for the name record of the 
particular GUID. This avoids a bottleneck at a central resource such as Auspice’s replica-
controllers. However, the tradeoff is that it is easy to generate a list of all GUIDs that hash to a 
target server. A Rainbow Table was generated and used to pick a GUID that corresponded to 
the target DMap server. The GUID was the same for all attacker-generated Insert requests to 
demonstrate the proof of concept of this attack.  
In order to analyze the effectiveness of the attack, tcpdump, a Unix command that can print to 
file the contents of packets on a network interface, was run on all DMap servers participating in 
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the experiment. Although many attackers do not measure the effectiveness of their attacks, the 
ability to do so may help them remain attack effectively and remain undetected.  We now 
outline how they could do so without special access to the target server. Since the target DMap 
server must accept Insert requests from arbitrary IP addresses (see Section 5.4 Tradeoffs), 
including that of the attacking server, it is safe for the attacker to assume that the attacker-
generated insert requests are succeeding with a similar rate experienced by legitimate clients. 
Under this assumption, the attacker could vary the attack frequency and use different GUIDs 
that all mapped to the target server (from the Rainbow Table), and keep track of which inserts 
succeed to measure the effectiveness of differing attack rates.    
If DMap were deployed, many different clients would be inserting themselves into DMap and 
looking up the locations of other devices. Since we had a limited number of nodes on ORBIT, 
one node acted as multiple clients, sending multiple insert requests to the target server. 
Funneling all client traffic through the same node also allowed us to easily measure the client’s 
success rate without varying link speeds and topologies between the client and target server. 
As shown in Figure 10, the client sends 1,000 inserts for GUIDs 1 to 1,000 in sequence. The 
DMap client takes in a parameter, t, and sets a 1000*t nanosecond = .01*t microsecond delay 
between client messages. As shown in Table 3, an efficient client delay was determined to be 
t=4, yielding a throughput of 1000 inserts per second.  
t Throughput  
2 967 inserts per second 
4 1000 inserts per second 
16 821 inserts per second 
Table 3. Client Insert Throughput 
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Figure 10. Our Attack. The client sends an Insert Request every 4 µs, one for each of Gi ϵ [1, 1000] to the target 
DMap server 10.14.1.2. The modified DMap server, or attack server, 10.14.1.7, sends recursive Insert Requests to 
all of the DMap servers with a GUID known to map to the target server. 
5.3 Results 
As explained in the previous section, a DNS flooding attack was run in the ORBIT testbed. DMap 
has built-in functionality to generate Cumulative Distributions of some statistics. The “delay” 
mentioned in the graphs is the amount of time between when the first attacker packet arrives 
at the target server (10.14.1.2) and when the first client packet arrives at the target server. A 
negative value, as in Figure 11, indicates that the client’s packet arrived at the target server 
before any of the attacker’s packets. Timestamps were determined by inspecting a tcpdump 
running on the target server during each experiment. Figure 11 demonstrates that, as the 
attacker sends inserts at a faster rate, the insert round-trip times experienced by the client 
47 
 
increases. One can observe some variation even among the two baseline trials without the 
attacker. When the attacker was sending inserts every 4 ms, 1,000 times slower than the client, 
only 604 of the client’s 1,000 inserts were successful.  For the trials in Figure 11, the attacker’s 
first insert arrived at the target less than a second before the first client’s insert.  
 
Figure 11. Cumulative Distribution Function of Client Round Trip Times with Varying Attack Rate. These trials were 
run with the purpose of minimizing the delay so that the effect of the attack rate could be observed. When sending 
at 16ms, the attacker’s first packet arrived at the target server after the client’s first packet arrived, despite starting 
the attacker before the client.  
Figure 12 shows what happens when the attacker has more of a head start. In order to get a 
sense of scale between Figure 10 and Figure 11, observe that the series “attacker sending every 
8 ms 0.62 s delay” appears in orange triangles in both graphs. This suggests that the amount of 
time the attack runs is a stronger indicator of a successful attack than the rate at which the 
attacker sends packets. This is further supported by the fact that for some longer delays, the 
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client was completely blocked from inserting any GUIDs. A trial with the attacker sending every 
8ms was performed with a 32.70 second delay, but none of the client’s inserts were successful.  
Another trial with the attacker sending every 4ms with an 11.07s delay also prevented the 
client from having any successful inserts.  
 
Figure 12. Cumulative Distribution Function of Client Round Trip Times with Varying Delays. This graph shows trials 
emphasizing the delay between the arrival of the first attacker’s packet at the target server and the arrival of the 
first client’s packet at the target server. Only 604 insert requests ever get completed by the client for the 9.74s 
delay, and only 53 are completed for each of the 15.15s and 18.29s delays.  
Next, the DMap statistics kept by the target server were analyzed.  
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Figure 13. Target server statistics for the “attacker sending every 4 ms 0.21 s delay” trial.  
As seen in Figure 13, the orange and green trend lines are barely distinguishable. We conclude 
from that factthat the Total Average Time per Insert is almost entirely made up of the Average 
Queue Time per Insert. The Total Client Inserts Arrived and Total Successful Client Inserts were 
determined from a tcpdump trace running on the target server. Packets sent from the client to 
the target were inserts, and each response back to the client from the target server is an insert 
response, acknowledging a successful insert. For the first five seconds, client inserts are 
completed at about the same rate they arrive at the target server. Around 5 seconds into the 
experiment, the average queue time per insert starts to increase, and continues increasing. At 
the same time, a noticeably smaller fraction of client inserts are successful, until 10 seconds 
when they grind to a halt – between 10 and 20 seconds, only 7 client inserts were successful.  
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Recall from Figure 9 that when a client inserts something into DMap, its first point of contact, 
the target server in our experiment, needs to forward the inserts to the appropriate servers to 
store the information contained in the insert. In order to successfully complete an insert, the 
target server needs to receive responses from those remote servers that store the contents of 
the insert. If the target server’s socket buffer is full, not only can it not receive inserts  from the 
client, but it can also miss responses from these remote servers. This phenomenon is supported 
by Figure 14, which shows the number of outstanding responses increase after 5 seconds and a 
huge spike in average remote time per insert.     
 
Figure 14. Inserts per Second, Outstanding Responses and Average Remote Time per Insert, measured by the Target 
Server.  
Finally, we examined the effect of the malicious DMap server on client Lookups. The attacking 
server sent attacks at a slow rate to ensure that all of the GUIDs being looked up were 
eventually able to be successfully inserted by the client. After the 1,000 GUIDs were inserted, 
lookup requests were sent for each of them. One might think that lookup would be less 
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affected by the DNS flooding attack, since only one of the K servers with a GUID’s mapping on it 
must be contacted. However, the client’s only point of contact in DMap is its closest DMap 
router, which has been flooded with inserts from the attacker. This increases how long it takes 
lookup requests to get through the target server, as shown in Figure 15. Without the attacker, 
95% of lookups were completed in 3.94281 ms, but with the attacking DMap server it took 
75.46862 ms, over 19 times slower.  
 
Figure 15. Cumulative Distribution Function of Client Round Trip Times with Lookup Requests. This graph shows one 
trial where all GNRS servers were behaving normally and the client looked up each of the 1,000 GUIDs it inserted. 
Then, inserts and lookups were done in a second trial with the attack server sending an inser t every 16 ms.  
5.4 Tradeoffs 
Computer system design involves tradeoffs. Sometimes, by fixing one problem, a software 
engineer introduces more. In this section, we discuss four possible approaches to preventing 
the attack demonstrated in 5.3 above, starting with approaches that would decrease the 
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system’s mobility functionality. These options, while feasible, would restrict DMap’s ability to 
meet the mobility design goals of MobilityFirst, a tradeoff we consider to not be worthwhile. 
Since the attack involves a malicious DMap server that could ignore GUID authentication, we do 
not consider that as a defense for this attack. 
A key part of this attack is that the requests coming from the malicious server are recursive, as 
overviewed in Section 5.1. One way this type of attack could be prevented is for all DMap 
servers to check that every received recursive request comes from devices in their AS. Then, 
when the attacking server sends the recursive requests to the other DMap servers, they would 
note that it is a recursive request with an external source and disregard it. However, if DMap 
servers were to ignore all “external” recursive inserts, the DMap servers would have to know 
who all of the first level clients are, and not allow new ones. This would restrict devices moving 
between ASs, and not meet MobilityFirst’s mobility goal. One could look into requiring a lower 
level handshake first to establish presence in an AS before being inserted into the GNRS.  
Another option would be to only allow a fixed number of recursive inserts from each Network 
Address in a given time period. Unfortunately, this would limit how often devices could move. 
Additionally, it would require additional per-Network Address state on each server to count the 
number of recent inserts. This could be ineffective against the attack, since the attacker sent 
inserts at rates three orders of magnitude slower than the client. If it was effective, the attacker 
could bypass this measure by spoofing its Network Address or rotating through which other 
DMap servers it sends all of the requests to, instead of just sending each insert request to all 
other DMap servers.  
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DMap might combat this attack by allowing more than one “local server” to serve each client. 
An attacker could still flood with insert requests, but would have to either find a GUID that 
would be inserted into all local servers serving the target client, or alternate between the GUIDs 
it is inserting. If the “backup” local GNRS server is well known, an attacker can find such GUID(s) 
easily. Since keeping secrets as a means of security is well-understood to be a weak approach, 
doing so is not a viable alternative to the backup server being well known.  
As discussed in the previous section, client Insert Requests are not the only type of 
communication getting dropped from the target server’s queue. When successful insert 
responses from remote servers dropped by queue, the initial server send them again, and 
eventually waits for a timeout before declaring the Insert (partially) successful. One option 
would be to use a priority queue, giving insert response packets a higher priority than new 
insert packets. If work has already been done to insert a GUID, that should be recorded; 
otherwise, the work will have to be done again. This does not solve the problem of insert 
requests getting dropped, it merely increases the likelihood that Insert Requests that have 
begun are successfully completed so that they are not resent by the client. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we demonstrated a denial of service flooding attack on the DMap Global Name 
Resolution Service system.  The viable approaches to prevent this attack, filtering and rate-
limiting Insert Requests, both involve a tradeoff with the support for mobility in the Global 
Name Resolution service.  
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6. Effects of Transport Layer Protocol on GNRS Design 
A Global Name Resolution System would lie in the application layer of the Internet Protocol 
Stack. Below the application layer is the Transport Layer. Applications need to interface with 
one or more protocols in the transport layer in order to successfully move information around 
the Internet.  Two widely used Transport Layer protocols are User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). UDP is a very lightweight protocol for stateless best-effort 
communication. TCP is a reliable, ordered transport layer protocol. When using TCP, a 
connection is established between each client-server pair via a three-way handshake, shown in 
Figure 16.  First, a synchronization packet is sent from the client to the server. That transmission 
is acknowledged by the server to the client and sent with a synchronization number from the 
server. Finally, the client acknowledges the server’s SYN and sends data. 
 
Figure 16. TCP Three-Way Handshake. [21] 
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UDP Insert Message TCP Insert Message 
70 bytes of data 70 bytes of data 
14 bytes Ethernet frame 14 bytes Ethernet frame 
20 bytes IPv4 header 20 bytes IPv4 header 
8 bytes UDP header 20 bytes TCP header 
112 bytes on wire 124 bytes on wire 
Table 4. Comparision of Minimum UDP and TCP Header Size 
When using UDP, unless a response is sent at the application layer, the client does not know if 
the server received its request. The request could have been dropped, or may just be taking a 
long time to reach the relevant remote servers.   
As discussed in Section 4.2, Auspice’s replica-controllers assume little contact compared to 
active replicas, and would be susceptible to a voluminous attack. It would be easier for them to 
throttle TCP flows than UDP packets. Replica-controllers would have a session open with each 
TCP client and can measure its rate of requests, and automatically ignore clients who request 
new information at unreasonable, attack level rates.  
There are two opportunities for DMap to verify that an insert request actually came from the 
GUID requesting insertion: the local DMap server that initially receives the request, and the 
(likely remote) DMap servers responsible for hosting the mapping.  Many denial of service 
attacks rely on the ability to spoof a target’s IP address to a local DMap server. Regardless of 
GNRS design, it is easier to pretend to be at a different address than when you are using UDP 
because a connection is never established, the network just routes packets to the address on 
the header. Spoofing an address is significantly more difficult when using TCP as an underlying 
protocol, because the client needs to receive the SYN-ACK at the IP address they sent the 
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server. This could be circumvented by using a man-in-the-middle attack, during which the 
attacker sits on the path between the client and the server and impersonates each to the other. 
Since DMap uses UDP, no man-in-the-middle attack is necessary to spoof targeted GUIDs as in 
the attack demonstrated in Chapter 5. 
If DMap was using TCP, it would be less important to verify insertion request data upon 
insertion, because the data is likely to have been verified by the initial DMap server receiving 
the request.  However, even though DMap runs on UDP, when a DMap server responsible for 
hosting GUID GX’s mapping receives a request to insert GUID GX at some network address(es), 
the server does not check to see if GUID GX is reachable at the bindings it claims it is located at. 
Although this means that information in DMap may not be accurate, this is a justified tradeoff.  
If the servers did check for connectivity at the given bindings, a reflection attack would be 
possible. In a reflection attack, a malicious device sends an insert request to the server, claiming 
to be at the target’s address. Then, since the server would check that the aforementioned 
address is valid, the target receives unwanted traffic.  This wastes the target’s bandwidth, 
which may be limited, especially in cases of rapid mobility that MobilityFirst was designed to 
support.  
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7. Future Work 
Testing under a realistic topologies and mobility model(s) remain a consideration for future 
work. The attack mentioned in Section 4.3, where migration messages are forged, could also be 
tested. It was not tested at this time because Migration Messages are not currently 
implemented. Additionally, instead of a constant request rate for sequential GUIDs, a Traffic 
Model using a Zipf distribution to model request rates for GUIDs would be more realistic and 
representative of actual Internet traffic.  
7.1 Topology  
The GNRS systems could be evaluated under a more geographically realistic network topology, 
using GeoTopo [22] to model the network topology. Additionally, one could compare how 
DMap and Auspice function across multiple topologies, instead of imposing a specific topology 
on them. Network architecture and network topology can influence each other’s evolution. 
Similarly, traffic loads and patterns may be different (in the immediate sense and as the Future 
Internet Architecture changes over time) based on the underlying network architecture.  
In the grid on ORBIT, the nodes are in a small room and all within radio range of each other, 
creating a mesh network, where each node is directly connected to each other node. It is 
possible to create a multi-hop topology in such an environment by injecting noise as in [23], but 
this is not functioning on ORBIT at the time of this publication. This noise injection system 
should be employed to prevent testing on a trivial “mesh” where each device is exactly one hop 
away from each other device. 
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7.2 Mobility Model 
Supporting mobility is at the core of MobilityFirst, and incorporating an appropriate mobility 
model is the next logical step for this study. The mobility model need only take into account 
mobility that would change a GUID’s NA. One advantage of name records mapping a GUID to an 
AS number is that when a GUID moves within an AS, its mapping (GX, AS 1) does not change. 
This means the system resources are not strained, or even used, when devices move within a 
network. As Yang et al. observed in [24], most device movement is within one AS. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to observe this in action as the DMap code does not have 
client-side updates implemented at this time.  
Since a NA is comparable to an AS in today’s Internet, we found a model derived from 
observing when users connected and disconnected to different ASs. Specifically, a Hidden 
Markov model derived in "Measurement and Modeling Study of User Transitioning Among 
Networks," gives a transition probability matrix of a user’s next state based on their current 
state [24, 25]. They include six states: (1) connected to zero networks (2) connected to zero 
new networks and one total network, (3) connected to one new network, (4) connected to 
multiple networks, none of which are new, (5) connected to multiple networks, one of which is 
new, and (6) connected to multiple new networks. Their model discretizes mobility among 
networks in discrete-time chunks of 15 minutes. In order to prevent “batch” movement in 
experiments, whenever the model dictates that a user changes state during a 15-minute period, 
the exact time during the 15-minute period could be randomly chosen.  
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Probability of Transitioning to Each State Given Current State 
Current 
State 
0 new, 0 
total 
0 new, 1 
total 
1 new, 1 
total 
0 new, >1 
total 
1 new, >1 
total 
>1 new, >1 
total 
0 new, 
0 total 
0.88577709 9.78E-06 0.11012325 0 0 0.00408987 
0 new, 
1 total 
0.20181485 0.7266925 0.02349103 0 0.04486134 0.00314029 
1 new, 
1 total 
0.6474509 0.2834485 0.04665651 0 0.01936993 0.00307416 
0 new, 
>1 total 
0.0749543 0.43327239 0.01005484 0.42413163 0.05393053 0.00365631 
1 new, 
>1 total 
0.17307092 0.59418932 0.01968135 0.15901281 0.052796 0.00124961 
>1 
new, 
>1 total 
0.4380704 0.40026076 0.03976532 0.07887875 0.03976532 0.00325945 
Table 5 Transition Probability Matrix [24, 25] 
Additionally, one may refer to [26], which quantitatively compares different network 
architectures that support mobility and discusses mobility of devices across ASs.   
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8. Conclusion and Comparison to Today’s Internet 
8.1 Suggestions  
In this section, we summarize suggestions to make the GNRS designs more secure. 
8.1.1 Auspice Suggestions 
Instead of automatically using Paxos for all GUIDs, Auspice could only use it for GUIDs that 
recursively represent groups of terminal GUIDs, which are more likely to have operations by 
many actors that need to be performed in the same order. Allowing variety among mappings 
for non-recursive GUIDs would allow Auspice, or the GUIDs themselves, to customize mappings 
based on where they are stored. As discussed in Section 3.4, this feature could increase 
effective communication with multi-homed devices.  
Another suggestion or design discussion regarding Auspice is the assumption that replica 
controllers will be contacted on a limited basis. Assuming this assumption is valid, it should be 
enforced programmatically.   
Finally, as discussed in Section 4.3.1, an attacker could just try to expand name records to push 
past the storage capabilities of Auspice servers’ databases by setting arbitrary (key, value) pairs.  
Vu et. al. address similar concerns in DMap by defining name records as simple GUID-NA 
mappings and claiming that each GUID can be multi-homed at up to 5 NAs [9].  
8.1.2 DMap Suggestions 
DMap stores much less per-GUID data than Auspice, which prevents the kind of attacks 
discussed in the previous section. However, DMap servers would benefit from keeping an 
additional bit of data per GUID: a Boolean value indicating whether the server is acting as a 
Deputy Autonomous System for that GUID’s mapping. This is one example where the tradeoff 
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between storage and a computation-intensive operation is clear. Keeping an additional 
true/false value would require minimal additional storage as it is literally a bit of information. 
The alternative to looking up this bit is the server that received a migration message for GUID 
GX computing whether it is a deputy for GX. This requires hashing the GUID at least M times, per 
the IP hole protocol5. Since the server would have to look up the name record for GX to see if 
the server even has a name record for GX to drop, looking up the deputy true/false value adds 
no additional computation time.  
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, DMap’s local replication specifies the use of an additional hash 
function within each AS to determine a local server on which to store mappings of GUIDs within 
the AS. During lookups, this prevents AS 1 from having to contact a remote AS to learn that 
GUID GX is located within AS 1. In case GX is not in AS 1, AS 1 simultaneously sends requests to 
the local server and to a “global” copy, using one of the original K hash functions.  
Since intra-AS routing is not stipulated by GNRS designs, intra-AS replication should not be 
either. For GZ located in AS 1, DMap leaves intra-AS routing – routing from AS 1’s gateway 
router to GZ’s device - up to AS 1.  AS 1 will already have to have a routing table to determine 
where each device is located within the AS. Since this is the case, DMap should leave loca l 
replication up to the ASs.   
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, DMap may fail to meet an availability goal for certain GUIDs. For 
some GUIDs, the independent hash functions output IPv4 addresses hosted by the same AS, 
                                                 
5 It may take more than M hashes if the server is not sure which of the K hash functions lead to the IP hole. 
Assuming at most one hash function leads to an IP hole it would take K + M hashes in the worst case.  
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resulting in one fewer placement of the GUID’s name record. There are at least two simple 
solutions to this issue. First, when a mapping overlaps, DMap servers could take the output of 
one of the hash functions and follow the IP hole protocol. Alternatively, the number of hash 
functions used to determine ASs could be increased, either by designating an extra “backup” 
hash function, or increasing the system parameter K.  GMap reduces the likelihood of such AS 
collisions in yet another way. GMap explicitly checks that the hosts picked within each level 
(global, local and regional) do not collide with hosts chosen in another level. The only possible 
server-collisions are among the replicas at each geographic level.   
8.1.1 GMap Suggestion 
While GMap’s insert algorithm offers a benefit over DMap, its lookup policy of first searching  
for GUID name records near the requester is futile when the GUID is actually located far away. 
This process would be more successful if regional and local caches were designated where the 
name records are expected. As demonstrated in Figure 6, when GUID Y wants to look up GUID X, 
GMap first checks the servers local to Y that X would be stored on if X were in the same 
geographic location as Y. Since these same servers are checked for any GUID in Y’s city or 
region that is looking up GUID X, it makes sense to have a copy of GX’s name record at these 
servers. If GX’s name record were cached on these servers, when X could be quickly resolved in 
Y’s region. However, under the current system design, these servers would only have X’s name 
record in their cache by the happy accident of being on the path traversed by a successful 
lookup request for GX.   
 
63 
 
As mentioned above, our goal was to discern the features of  MobilityFirst’s architecture that 
allow continued communication during node mobility through examining denial of service 
attacks in proposed global name resolution services. 
8.2 Comparison to Current Internet 
Routing on the Internet is based on Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. IP addresses were 
designed when devices were connected to the Internet via a wired connection, such as 
Ethernet. The IP address uniquely identified the device connected via the wire to the network, 
and also act as a routable address used by routers to determine the next hop on a packet’s way 
to its destination IP address. Today, devices may be connected to multiple IP addresses at once, 
or wirelessly switch between IP addresses while communicating with other network devices.  In 
the current Internet, devices that are more mobile, such as personal computers and laptops, 
tend to have less traffic than static devices. Total mobile data traffic (including smartphones, 
tablets and mobile PCs) is 5.3 EB per month, while total fixed data traffic is 60 EB per month 
[27].  
However, there are certain instances where an extremely popular, high traffic source is moving. 
For example, consider the Super Bowl, where many people are tuned in to a streamed source 
moving between many different cameras. Here, there could be a GUID representing the main 
Super Bowl broadcast that would relocate rapidly.  
IP forms a flexible base for today’s Internet, with more features and constraints built on top of 
it. It is a “best effort” system that is designed to be simple and approximate. As complexity 
rises, so do opportunities for security breaches and DoS attacks. With a best effort system, one 
can assume something(s) go wrong, and that’s tolerable in the system. Instead, if one is trying 
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to keep a system perfectly secure and work in every eventuality and edge case, it becomes too 
cumbersome to be effective. Security-wise, it can turn into an attack/patch war. Similarly, as a 
basic service of Mobility First, the GNRS should have as few constraints as possible. Key 
principles of computer system design are simplicity and modularity. Adding additional protocols 
on top of the GNRS would allow for more advanced features and could incorporate more 
constraints on how they are used, while leaving the GNRS as a simple primitive.  
Auspice struggles more in this respect, trying to keep per-GUID statistics and do per-GUID load 
balancing, which can be computationally expensive and use a lot of storage. This would likely 
require a lot of fine-tuning on the length of epochs.  Also, Paxos may be too close to trying to be 
“perfect” with an all-or-nothing update approach.  
A major difference between today’s Internet and MobilityFirst’s network is the target endpoint, 
an IP address and a Network Address, respectively. “Bringing down” (ie. clogging) a Network 
Address affects more devices than an IP address, but is harder to do because the link capacity 
would be greater. Handley and Rescorla discuss denial of service attacks in the current Internet 
[28]. Like many denial of service attacks in the current Internet, and setting aside the basic 
advice of securing system-critical servers, we leave the attack demonstrated in Chapter 5 
unsolved. In order to meaningfully address the malicious server attack on a target server in the 
DMap implementation of a Global Name Resolution Service, the main design goal of supporting 
rapid mobility would be compromised as it would restrict either which GUIDs could register 
with a DMap servers or how frequently they could change their name record. The Global Name 
Resolution Service has some fault-tolerance build in, having K replicas of each GUID precisely 
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for robustness to failures, including denial of service attacks. With enough replication, the GNRS 
system designs proposed are, like the current Internet, likely to function “well enough”.  
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